Introduction
When considering the role of former prisoners in conflict transformation we need to consider three key issues:
1. What is conflict transformation?
2. Why are former prisoners a key component in conflict transformation?
And
3. How conflict transformation challenges others?
It is important to consider these three issues because failure or refusal to do so usually leads to the collapse of any conflict transformation process we may undertake. Conversely an understanding equips us with an ability to implement a successful conflict transformation process and predict the nature of its opposition.
The primary source of experience for this paper is the Northern Ireland ‘Peace Process’, which illustrates how a seemingly intractable conflict can be transformed. As important the current impasse in that process illustrates how a failure or refusal to understand it can create a dynamic that could lead to its collapse. Whilst this experience can give an understanding of the issues at hand it is important to state that shared experience cannot replace actual experience. Thus one would urge the reader to understand that while it is possible to take some ideas from another process, truly successful conflict transformation is homegrown.
What is Conflict Transformation?
Conflict transformation is a process with two aims:
1. To change the nature of a conflict from a violent to a peaceful one.
And
2. To provide the space for political, religious and community leaders to enable a long-term conflict resolution process.
From the start we should understand that this process is the first step on a very long journey.
When seeking to understand what is meant by ‘changing the nature of a conflict from a violent to a peaceful political one’ we need to consider the nature of the conflict at hand. Why is it taking place? What motivates the participants? And why is it violent? For some this may be difficult, as it requires them to view the conflict in new and challenging ways. Having said that if we are to initiate a successful conflict transformation process this is what they must do.
In Northern Ireland the issue of why the conflict was happening proved to be more complex than many people had expected. On the surface we had the easily understood Irish/Catholic versus British/ Protestant confrontation. But this proved to be only one facet of a very complicated contest. For many ‘the war’ was a way of life. For others the primary motivation was revenge for an act of violence committed against themselves, their family or their community. And for some ‘the war’ provided convenient cover for criminal activity. The important point was that people’s views on why the conflict was happening had a direct bearing on how they viewed the prisoners.
Catholics tended to see the prisoners and the paramilitary groups (Provisional Irish Republican Army/Irish National Liberation Army) as politically motivated defenders of their community and thus were solid in their support for the release of detainees. Most Protestants saw the ‘Security Forces’ as the defenders of their community and consequently viewed the prisoners as ‘illegitimate’ or ‘criminal’. As important these Protestants tended to view the politics of the Catholic community to be ‘illegitimate’ or ‘criminal’ and thus opposed recognising their political rights. In the 1960’s this refusal to accommodate Catholics democratically had led many to adopt violence as a means of political expression.
A minority of Protestants viewed the prisoners as politically motivated defenders of their community. They were from the working class or ‘Loyalist’ areas of Northern Ireland were pro-British/Protestant paramilitary groups (Ulster Volunteer Force/Ulster Defence Association) had filled the vacuum left by the lack of effective security force protection. Throughout the conflict transformation process the ‘Loyalist’ population was always more willing to accept the legitimacy of Catholic political objectives questioning only the violent methods used by their paramilitary groups. Conversely when the conflict transformation project was launched those Protestants who viewed both the prisoners and Catholic politics as ‘illegitimate’ or ‘criminal’ were its stiffest opponents.
The experience taught us that before we launch any conflict transformation process we need to work hard to change the perceptions of those who view the ‘Security Forces’ as the only legitimate entity in the conflict. We are not asking them to legitimise paramilitary groups. We only hope they might accept that in other communities paramilitary groups are the accepted legitimate forces. As important we need to challenge the idea that an opposing political idea is ‘illegitimate’ or ‘criminal’. Conflict transformation rejects violence as a method of political expression by accepting the right to democratically pursue views we ourselves may totally oppose.
Why are former prisoners a key component in the Conflict Transformation?
Former prisoners are a key component in a conflict transformation process. In the absence of genuine democratic structures they are their community’s political leaders. Their actions (though abhorrent to many) are the political expression of a population who believes that they have no effective method of peaceful political expression. The Northern Ireland experience indicates that if an effective method of peaceful political expression is created the population quickly turns against violence. As the political leaders of their generation former prisoners are best placed to enact this transformation.
In the Loyalist community David Ervine (Progressive Unionist Party leader) is the most effective leader in the conflict transformation process. In retrospect many people now believe that the lack of ‘Security Force’ input was a mistake. The British government negotiated and signed a deal without preparing the many thousands of serving and former ‘Security Force’ personnel for what it meant. This was in sharp contrast to the years of work carried out by Adams, Ervine and their supporters (former prisoners and paramilitaries who were never caught). As a result when the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998 ‘Security Force’ personnel and the population who supported them were totally unprepared for what it meant. Unsurprisingly they opposed the deal and continue to do so. The present difficulty in the ‘Peace Process’ can be traced back to that most fundamental of errors.
As a former prisoner Ervine carries legitimacy within the paramilitary groups. Thus in the early 1990’s when he and his supporters first advocated conflict transformation people listened. The argument was that after twenty-five years violence was no longer as effective as a means of political expression. As a result if, as they maintained they were, the paramilitary groups were politically motivated then they were duty bound to declare a cease-fire to allow for any possible tactical shift. Those who expressed doubts were often won over by the credentials of Ervine and his supporters. Had he not been a former fighter and prisoner his constituency would not have listened. In 1994 when the cease-fires were announced the paramilitary groups had to continue in existence to ensure it was not broken. Ten years on the political solution is still to be found in Northern Ireland, but the cease-fires remain intact proving that the former prisoners continue to be more effective advocates for peace than most politicians.
How does conflict Transformation challenge others?
Conflict transformation is not the solution to a conflict. It challenges politicians, religious and community leaders to enable a conflict resolution process. To do this the majority must be prepared to address the political, religious and communal issues that fuel the conflict. In Northern Ireland the majority of religious and community leaders were prepared to enter into a conflict transformation process. Throughout the 1990’s cross community activities blossomed. Church congregations met, schools took children on a whole range of inter-denominational (Catholic and Protestant) activities and within every community leaders sought to create contacts across the ancient divide. This created the momentum that led to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. At that point paramilitary groups signed up to the principles of non-violence and engaged with the ‘Commission on De-Commissioning’ led by the Canadian General John De Chastelain. The idea was simple as the political solution took root they would fade away as irrelevant.
The honeymoon period was short lived. The opposition emerged quickly and eventually stalled the process. The opposition came from within the Protestant community and referred to itself as the ‘law abiding majority’. Their political leaders had declined to take part in the negotiations leading up to the Good Friday Agreement as they would not ‘talk to terrorists’. Many believe this refusal was a tactic to avoid discussing the core political issues that fuelled the conflict. The ‘anti-agreement’ politicians obstructed the work of the New Northern Ireland Assembly and exploited the inevitable weaknesses in the Good Friday Agreement.
Despite all this political instability the paramilitary groups remain on cease-fire. This is down to the work of former prisoners whose continued stabilising influence ensures that paramilitary groups and the communities they come from do not slip back into confrontation and violence. All agree though that this is not sustainable in the long term and a political solution needs to be found.
Conclusions
Former prisoners can play a key role in a conflict transformation process though this should not be seen as a solution to conflict. Important points are:
1. Conflict transformation creates the space for a resolution process. Conflict resolution requires the active support of political, religious and community leaders.
2. If politicians are not willing to discuss the relevant political issues the process will eventually fail.
3. Former prisoners need support as they try to move the paramilitary groups into retirement. This is especially true when politicians make impossible demands. We need to realise that those who make the toughest demands from the former prisoners are seeking to avoid difficult political issues.
And
4. The conflict transformation process is neither easy nor perfect so all concerned should be prepared for set backs as well as progress.
David Rose
Deputy Leader of the Progressive Unionist Party of Northern Ireland
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