Hobson's Choice
Bulmer Hobson & the Armed Struggle

Billy Mitchell

So long as there are sizeable numbers of people aspiring to either a United Ireland or to the maintenance of the Union with the rest of the United Kingdom, there will always be conflict. As a Unionist, all that I ask is that the conflict is conducted through the medium of politics and not by the use of violence.

Bulmer Hobson was a physical force Republican who sat on the Supreme Council of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, forerunner of Sinn Fein. Although a physical force man who was cold and calculating in his views on the use of armed force, Hobson insisted that before starting an insurrection republicans should await the decision of the majority of the Irish people. For Hobson, the justification for physical force lay in the will of the Irish people and not in the will of an elite republican vanguard. Even then, Hobson insisted that it was wrong to engage in physical force unless there was a clear possibility of victory. In his "Defensive Warfare" (Belfast, 1909) Hobson argued that it was wrong to engage in armed conflict if it was clear that there was no chance of victory.

"We must estimate our resources and those of our opponents and only venture into conflict where the chances of war are in our favour. We must not fight to make a display of heroism, but fight to win". As far as Hobson was concerned the key question to be asked before engaging in armed conflict was, will it achieve our objective? In an address to a gathering of Irish Volunteers a few days before the Easter Rising (1916) Hobson argued that "no man has the right to risk the fortunes of the country in order to create for himself a niche in history". His opposition to the insurrection led to his marginalisation within republicanism.

James Connolly was another republican who believed in the right to engage in the armed struggle. Yet Connolly argued that the moral justification for armed action lay with the people. Writing in 1896 he argued that before anyone engaged in insurrection they should come out into the open and fight elections to gauge whether the people were ready for it or not. "To counsel rebellion without first obtaining the moral sanction of the people, would be an act of criminal folly�" (Shan Van Vocht, October 1896). It could be argued that Connolly ignored his own counsel when he agreed to participate in the Easter Rising without obtaining the sanction of the Irish people, but that can be accounted for if Easter 1916 was meant to be a Blood Sacrifice as opposed to a protracted armed struggle.

Frank Ryan, close associate of Peadar O' Donnell and leader of the Irish Republican contingent that served with the International Brigades, came to believe that politics and dialogue should replace the armed struggle. Tom Jones, one of Ryan's fellow prisoners in Spain, said that "Frank believed that the whole of Ireland would eventually re-unite, not so much by force of arms but through British and world public opinion and by agreement with the Protestant people of Northern Ireland" (Recollections of Frank Ryan, p4).

It has become obvious to most people in Northern Ireland that no one side will achieve a military victory. Twenty-five years of violence and counter-violence has not succeeded in forcing either Republicans or Unionists to surrender their ideals and aspirations. If anything, violence has sought to strengthen rather than to weaken the resolve of both communities to remain attached to their beliefs. Where it is clear that military objectives cannot be achieved the sacrifice of life becomes futile and senseless. I believe that Hobson would argue today that it would be wrong to continue with the armed struggle knowing that it could not achieve its objectives.

Both Hobson and Connolly argued that armed action ought to enjoy the moral sanction of the Irish people. The referendum on the Good Friday Agreement was held in both political jurisdictions and the overwhelming majority of the Irish people endorsed the terms of that Agreement. Although the Irish Diaspora was not included in the referendum, there is substantial evidence that the key players and opinion makers amongst the Irish abroad also support the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. If anyone now enjoys the moral approval of the Irish people it is those who endorse the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. No organisation, republican or nationalist, which claims to be acting on behalf of the Irish people, north and south, has a mandate to engage in aggressive armed conflict.

The danger for all of us, Unionist, Republican and Nationalist alike, is that if the Good Friday Agreement is scrapped then the result of the referenda, including the mandate for non-violence, could become meaningless. Yet the desire of the vast majority of people, Unionist and Nationalist, is that the conflict be carried out in a non-violent and purely democratic manner.

Tommy Mc Kearney, in his article "Republicanism in the 21st Century" (Fourthwrite, Spring 2000) seems to question the idea that "supporting the armed struggle is of itself somehow the essence of republican fidelity". Such questioning, from someone whose credentials as a republican are impeccable, must carry some weight in the debate about the use of armed force as part of the republican strategy. He is not saying that the use of arms is wrong in all circumstances, but simply that republicanism is not wedded to a strategy of armed conflict. There are other means open to republicans and, as someone who is committed to trying to transform the conflict from one of violent encounter to peaceful encounter, I would urge republicans to help radical thinkers like Mc Kearney to develop a fresh non-violent approach to the conflict.

(First published in "Fourthwrite", The Journal of the Irish Republican Writers' Group, Issue No.2, Summer 2000").